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TORTS: ASSAULT; BATTERY
BATTERY
Definition. A harmful, or an offensive, touching of the
plaintiff's person, caused directly or indirectly by a volun-
tary act .of the defendant with an intention to inflict a harm-
ful or an offensive touching, is a battery.
Offensive Touching. A touching of another's person may
be both offensive and harmful, or it may be merely offensive
and not inflict substantial harm. A touching which is not
harmful but which is offensive to a normal or reasonable
person is a battery, and it subjects the actor to liability if
the touching is not consented to or privileged. In this type
of battery, it is the insult or offensiveness of the touching
that is important and not damage in fact. A certain amount
of contact with one's person must be tolerated in decent
society. Thus, "if two or more meet in a narrow passage,
and without any violence or design of harm, the one touches
the other gently, it will be no battery."1 But "if any of them
1 Per Holt, C. J., in Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. Rep. 149, 90 Eng. Rep. 958
(1704), B. 5, H."98, K. 87, G. 6.
The cases cited are keyed up to some of the case books on Torts, as follows:
B-Bohlen's Cases (3rd ed.); Burdick-Burdick's Cases (4th ed.); G-Green's
Cases (2nd ed.); H-Hepburn's Cases (2nd ed.); K-Keigwin's Cases (3rd ed.);
W-Wilson's Cases (2nd ed.).
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use violence against the other, to force his way in a rude
inordinate manner, it will be a battery."2  An offensive
touching may be inflicted in many ways. Thus, forcibly
pushing the plaintiff's hat back on his head, in order to see
his face and identify him, was held to be a battery.3 A milk-
man who, against the express command of a customer, en-
tered the latter's sleeping room early one morning and forci-
bly wakened hiin in order to present a milk bill, was held
liable in trespass for a battery.4 The forcible cutting of a
pauper's hair by parish officials was held to be a battery.5
On the other hand, merely touching a fireman, who was en-
gaged in directing a stream of water upon a burning house,
for the purpose of attracting his attention and giving him
advice, was held not to be a battery; it was not an act which
would be offensive to a normal sense of personal dignity.'
Touching another person in a friendly manner, for a benevo-
lent purpose, is not a battery.' A certain amount of horse-
play might be tolerated and not be illegal conduct as be-
tween certain persons and on certain occasions.8 A gentle
slap, in a friendly greeting, probably would not be offensive
to a reasonable person; but if the touching is inflicted with
a great amount of force, it should be a battery. A touching
in a friendly scuffle, voluntarily entered into, might not be
an offensive touching; furthermore, consent, or assumption
of risk, might bar a recovery in such a case. So, in regard
to horseplay on the playground of a school; but in the
schoolroom such conduct is out of order and constitutes a
2 Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. Rep. 149, 90 Eng. Rep. 958 (1704), B. 5, H. 98,
K. 87, G. 6.
3 Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 So. 753, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070 (1910),
W. 45.
4 Richmond v. Fiske, 160 Mass. 34, 35 N. E. 103 (1893), G. 7, H. 47.
5 Forde v. Skinner, 4 Car. & P. 239, 34 R. R. 791 (1830), H. 43.
6 Coward v. Baddeley, 4 H. & N. 478 (1859), K. 89.
7 United States v. Ortega, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 971, 4 Wash. C. C. 531 (1825),
B. 5.
8 See: Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N. E. 484 (1902), G. 112.
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battery.9 A particular touching might not be offensive to a
reasonable person, but if it is inflicted on a very sensitive
person, with knowledge of his peculiar sensitiveness, it should
be a battery. A touching may not be regarded as offensive
at the time it is inflicted, due to a mistake or to false repre-
sentations; if, however, the person upon whom it is inflicted
later regards it as offensive, upon discovering the true situa-
tion, and if the touching really offends a normal sense of
personal dignity, it is a battery. Thus, a magnetic healer
who induced a young girl to unnecessarily expose her person
and took indecent liberties with her, was held liable on a
charge of assault and battery.' The interest protected by
this type of battery is the interest in freedom from a bodily
touching which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal
dignity.
Harmful Touching. A battery may consist of a harmful
touching of the plaintiff's person, caused by the defendant
with an intent to inflict a harmful or an offensive touching
either of the plaintiff's person or that of a third person.
As to common law procedure, the numerical weight of
authority supports the view that for an immediate and
forcible injury to the plaintiff's person, attributable to a
negligent act of the defendant, either trespass or case will
lie, at the option of the plaintiff." The minority rule is that
trespass is the only remedy for such an injury. 12  Trespass
is the only remedy, at the common law, for a wilful and im-
mediate injury to the plaintiff's person. 3 Where the plain-
tiff has an option to declare in trespass or case, for a negli-
gent battery, he must consider the rule that in case of negli-
9 Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 52, 50 N. W. 403, 14 L. R. A. 226, 27 A. S. R.
47 (1891), B. 7, W. 46, G. 107.
10 Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82 N. W. 142 (1900), B. 51. Accord, in
principle: De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N. W. 146 (1881); Blossom v.
Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434 (1868).
11 Shipman's Common Law Pleading (2nd ed.) 57.
12 Shipman's Common Law Pleading (2nd ed.) 58.
13 Puterbaugh, Common Law Pleading and Practice (10th ed., by Jones) 448.
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gence there is no such invasion of rights as to entitle a plain-
tiff to recover at least nominal damages; there must be some
damage in fact, in order to recover in an action for a negli-
gent injury, if the plaintiff declares in case. 4 But if the
plaintiff declares in trespass, or in the case of a wilful touch-
ing, nominal damages only may be awarded.' 5 But the jury
should not be restricted to an award of nominal damages
merely in case of an intentional touching; the jury may con-
sider the features of insult, indignity, and hurt to feelings.'6
Also, an intentional touching, although it may not substan-
tially impair the physical structure of the plaintiff's body, is
a physical injury in the sense that it will authorize an award
of punitive damages.17 While, as stated above, in case of a
mere negligent touching some damage in fact is necessary in
order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it is difficult, as a
practical matter, to distinguish between substantial and un-
substantial impairments of the physical structure of the
plaintiff's body. In case of a mere negligent touching of the
plaintiff's body, producing no appreciable effect, the maxim
de minimis non curat lex would be applicable. But if a slight,
negligent, impact with the plaintiff's body results in a phys-
iological or an emotional disturbance or in pain, recovery has
been allowed.' 8 Some courts have defined battery as an
intentional infliction of violence upon the plaintiff; but they
have said that in case of gross negligence or recklessness an
intent may be implied.' 9
14 Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 200 Mass. 303, 86 N. E. 511 (1908);
Ochs v. Public Service Ry. Co., 81 N. J. L. 661, 80 AtI. 495, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.)
240, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 255 (1911).
15 Armstrong v. Little, 20 Del. 255, 54 At. 742 (1903); Wood v. Cummings,
197 -Mass. 80, 83 N. E. 318 (1908); Shaffer v. Austin, 68 Kan. 234, 74 Pac. 1118
(1904).
18 South Brilliant Coal Company v. Williams, 206. Ala. 637, 91 So. 589 (1921).
17 South Brilliant Coal Company v. Williams, 206 Ala. 637, 91 So. 589 (1921).
18 Homans v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 189 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902),
B. 296; Hack v. Dady, 127 N. Y. S. 22 (1911).
19 The Lord Derby, 17 Fed. 265 (1883), H. 37 (construing the 16th Ad-
miralty rule to determine whether the action was properly brought in personam);
Perkins v. Stein & Co., 94 Ky. 433, 22 S. W. 649, 20 L. R. A. 861 (1893), W. 44
(construing survival statute). But cf. Anderson v. Arnold's Ex'r, 79 Ky. 370 (1881).
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The interest protected by this type of battery is the in-
terest in freedom from a harmful contact with the plaintiff's
person, whether inflicted intentionally or negligently. One
of the early functions of the writ of trespass, in case of a
battery, was preservation of the King's peace. It served to
avert private vengeance and the desire for reprisal. The end
of law was a peaceable ordering of society.2" The writ of
trespass was useful for this purpose because of its punitive
function and because it firnished the injured person a sub-
stitute for revenge. It served to protect the social interest
in the general security. Incidentally, it gave protection to
the individual interest in freedom from harmful or offensive
touchings. At the early common law, it was probably neces-
sary for the plaintiff, in an action of trespass, to allege and
prove that the trespass was committed by force and arms."1
A trespass had a penal nature; the defendant, if found guilty,
could have been punished by the court trying the action.
Thus, the action of trespass was of a mixed character,7-penal
and reparatory." There is uncertainty as to the time of origin
of the reparatory function of the adtion of trespass; but in
the reign of Edward I we find in the Year Books a record
of the successful plaintiff recovering his damages.2" The
penal feature, the fine, of a trespass, was abolished by statute
in 1694.24 In the course of time, the allegation as to force
and arms came to be regarded as unnecessary or as mere
surplusage. The action of trespass came to be looked upon
as a private remedy. Its development has, however, closely
coincided with that of battery in the criminal law, and many
essentials of the civil wrong are identical with those of the
crime. In modern law the emphasis in trespass for a battery
20 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
Harv. L. Rev. 195, 199.
2- See: Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of.Trespass, 33 Yale L. Jour.
799; 34 id. 343, 358.
22 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 308.
28 Y. B., 33 Edw. I (R. S.) 258.
24 Stat. S & 6 William and Mary, C. 12.
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is upon the interest of the plaintiff in freedom from harmful
or offensive impacts with his person.
Another's Person. There can be no doubt as to whether
or not violence inflicted upon another's person by striking,
beating, or kicking him is sufficient contact with his person
to constitute a battery. The cases dealing with the question
as to the sufficiency of the contact with another's person deal
with offensive touchings where the contact is with something
closely associated with another's physical person or body.
There are many examples in the cases of insulting contacts
with things closely connected with one's body which the
courts have.regarded as part of one's personality and as an
offense to one's sense of personal dignity: Seizing the breast
of the coat of the prosecuting witness;25 pushing the plain-
tiff's hat back on his head;26 striking the cane carried by the
prosecuting witness;2 7 snatching paper from the plaintiff's
hand; 28 throwing over a chair or carriage in which the plain-
tiff is sitting; 29 jerking and pulling a third person against
whom the plaintiff is leaning; "o opening and putting hand in
box held by plaintiff; 1 starting an automobile of which the
plaintiff has hold;3 2 and striking a horse hitched to a vehicle
in which the plaintiff is sitting.3 It is doubtful as to whether
or not the mere striking of a vehicle would be considered an
offensive touching as to all persons seated therein. So, with
reference to a kick or blow inflicted on a dog attached to a
leash held by its master. If the force so applied is intended
25 United States v. Ortega, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 971 (1825), B. 5.
26 Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 So. 753, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070 (1910),
W. 45.
27 Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 1 L. ed. 59 (1784).
28 Dyk v. De Young, 35 Ill. App. 138 (1889), H. 35.
29 Hopper v. Reeve, 7 Taunt. 698, 129 Eng. Rep. 278 (1817), H. 33.
30 Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N. E. 484 (1902), G. 112.
31 Wilson v. Orr, 210 Ala. 93, 97 So. 133 (1923).
32 Brodsky v. Rieser, 195 App. Div. 557, 186 N. Y. S. 841 (1921).
33 Bull v. Colton, 22 Barb. 94 (1856); Clark v. Downing, 55 Vt. 259, 45 Am.
Rep. 612 (1882).
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to and does reach the persons seated in the vehicle, or the
master leading the dog, the conduct of the actor should be
held to be a battery.
Direct and Indirect Contacts, or Impacts, with the Plain-
tiff's Person, Legally Caused by the Defendant. At the com-
mon law, trespass is the only remedy for an intentional and
immediate injury to the plaintiff's person. For all direct
contacts, or impacts, with the plaintiff's person, trespass is,
by the numerical weight of authority, a proper remedy; for
a direct contact, caused negligently by the defendant, the
plaintiff may elect between trespass and case, as a procedural
matter at the common law. For all indirect contacts, or im-
pacts, with the plaintiff's person, case is the only remedy.
The usual illustration used in distinguishing between direct
and indirect consequences of an act is that of throwing a
log into a highway. If the log strikes a traveler in falling,
the consequence is direct; but if the traveler stumbles over
the log, after it has come to rest, the result is indirect. Stated
differently, the damage caused by a force set in motion by
the act of the defendant, and resulting before the force
reaches a state of stable equilibrium, is direct; but damage
caused by the force after it has reached a state of stable
equilibrium is indirect and consequential. The matter is not
as simple as this test might appear to be, and the distinction
does not possess any logical basis. It is often difficult to
determine when the results of a force set in motion by an
act cease to be direct and become indirect. Nomenclature
and classification of rights still depend, to some extent, upon
the distinction. Thus, in Innes v. Wylie " a policeman, act-
ing under orders of the defendants, prevented the plaintiff
from entering a room, by standing in the doorway; the court
instructed the jury that if he merely passively obstructed
the entrance no "assault" was committed. Suppose the de-
fendants had cried out "fire," and thus caused some one in
34 1 Car. & Kir. 257, 70 R. R. 786 (1844), H. 35.
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the room to run against the policeman? In State v. Mon-
roe " the defendant administered croton oil to the pros-
ecuting witness by placing the oil in a piece of candy; the
court instructed the jury that if the defendant intended the
prosecuting witness, or some other person, to consume the
croton oil, by way of a trick or joke, he would be guilty of
an assault and battery. In Scott v. Shepherd 36 the defend-
ant threw a lighted squib into a market place, probably in-
tending to do mischief of some kind; the squib fell upon the
"standing" of Y, and W, to prevent injury to himself and the
wares of Y, threw the squib across the market place and it
fell upon the "standing" of R, who, to prevent injury to his
goods, threw the squib across another part of the market
place, and, "in so throwing it, struck the plaintiff then in the
said market" place, causing the plaintiff to lose the sight of
one eye. The court entertained no doubt as to the defend-
ant's liability. The only question was in what form of ac-
tion, whether trespass or case, the defendant was liable.
Blackstone, J., thought that trespass would not lie against
the defendant, at the instance of the plaintiff, on the theory
that the force set in motion be the defendant had come to
rest, and a new impetus, a new direction, was given to the
squib by "two successive rational agents." He said that
case would probably lie for the consequential damage to the
plaintiff. The majority of the court held that trespass would
lie, on the theory that the plaintiff's injury was the immediate
result of the act of the defendant; the acts of W and R were
instinctive and in self defense, and were a continuation of the
force set in motion by the defendant.
The person causing a harmful or an offensive touching
need not come into immediate contact with the plaintiff's
person. The touching may be inflicted through some instru-
mentality or as a result of some force set in motion by the
35 121 N. C. 677, 28 S. E. 547, 43 L. R. A. 861, 61 A. S. R. 686 (1897), H. 34.
36 2 W. B1. 892, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773), H. 29, G. 90, W. 505, B. 258.
TORTS: ASSAULT; BATTERY
actor. Examples: Striking with a whip;37 throwing a piece
of mortar which hits the plaintiff; 3" spitting in the plaintiff's
face; " and the croton oil and squib cases considered in the
preceding paragraph.
Voluntary Act. Professor Beale says that "the starting
point of any investigation of legal liability is some act or
non-action of a human being." 4 o There are very few in-
stances of legal liability based upon non-action. In most
cases wherein liability has been imposed there has been a
voluntary act on the part of the defendant. In Innes v.
Wylie "' the court instructed the jury that if the-policeman,
standing in the doorway, with whom the plaintiff came in
contact, was merely passive, no "assault" was committed.
Thus, in battery, some voluntary, physical act on the part
of the defendant is necessary to create liability; mere non-
action is not sufficient. Some difficulty has been encountered
in the cases in determining when a physical act is voluntary.
In Smith v. Stone,42 in an action of trespass, the defendant
pleaded that he was carried upon the plaintiff's land by other
persons and that he "was not there voluntarily." The court
held that the effect of the plea was to deny the trespass, and
that there was no trespass on the part of the defendant. In
Gibbons v. Pepper " an action of trespass for an assault and
battery was brought against the defendant; his plea was
that he was riding a horse on the highway, that the horse
became frightened and ran away with him, so that he
could not stop the horse, and the horse ran over the plain-
tiff against his (the defendant's) will. On demurrer, judg-
ment was given for the plaintiff, because the effect of the
plea was to deny that there was a battery. The defendant
37 State v. Davis, 1 Ired. L. 125, 35 Am. Dec. 735 (1840), B. 12.
38 Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130, 26 Am. Rep. 81 (1877).
39 Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 II. 553 (1872).
40 Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 637.
41 1 Car. and Kir. 257, 70 R. R. 786 (1844), H. 35.
42 Style 65, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (1647), W. 24, B. 1.
43 1 Ld. Raym. 38 (1695), W. 24, B. 1.
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should have pled the general issue, as his act was not volun-
tary, and he could have shown this under the general issue.
The court said that if the defendant had spurred the horse
and thus caused it to run over the plaintiff, there would have
been a battery. An "act," as thus considered, means a physi-
cal act of the defendant, and does not include its conse-
quences. The term "voluntary act" means an exertion of
the will objectively determined. So defined, the use of the
defendant's body, by third persons, as an instrument by
which to invade the plaintiff's interest in the exclusive pos-
session and enjoyment of his real estate is not a voluntary
act of the defendant." Where the defendant, while driving
his automobile, is stricken with paralysis or with an epileptic
fit, which he has no reason to anticipate, and while in this
condition the movement of his car continues and it strikes
the plaintiff, there is no voluntary act on the part of the
defendant.45 So, if the defendant is overtaken by sleep while
driving his automobile; any wrongful conduct must be pre-
dicated upon his conduct in permitting himself to fall asleep.
An instinctive act or movement of the defendant in an emer-
gency not created by him is not a voluntary act.4" The dif-
ficulty in this type of cases is to determine whether or not
the act is instinctive or a rapid exercise of reasoning power."
In Cole v. Turner "' the court said that "the least touching
of another in anger is a battery." While a touching in anger
would be a sufficient act to constitute a battery, it is not
necessary that the touching should be in anger. Any inten-
tional touching of or impact with the plaintiff's person,
caused or committed by the defendant, and offensive to a
reasonable sense of personal dignity, is an offensive touch-
44 Smith v. Stone, Style 65, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (1647), W. 24, B. 1.
45 Slattery v. Haley, 3 Dom. L. Rep. 156 (1923), B. 2; Wishone v. Yellow
Cab Co., 20 Tenn. App. 229, 97 S. W. 2d 452 (1936).
46 Filippone v. Reisenburger, 119 N. Y. S. 632 (1909), B. 4; Laidlaw v.
Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679 (1899).
47 See: 7 Harv. L. Rev. 302.
47a 6 Mod. Rep. 149, 90 Eng. Rep. 958 (1704), B. 5, H. 98, K. 87, G. 6.
TORTS: ASSAULT; BATTERY
ing in the law of battery; the fact that the act of the defend-
ant is done as a practical joke,4" or without malice or per-
sonal hostility towards the plaintiff,49 is no defense. In
Illinois a statute permits the issuance of an execution against
the body of the defendant in case of a judgment recovered
for a tort, if there has been a special finding in the case that
malice is the gist of the action. In construing this statute,
the Illinois courts have held that malice is the gist of the ac-
tion of trespass for an assault and battery, where the de-
fendant has been arrested on a capias ad satisfaciendum
issued in a judgment recovered in the action.50 In case of
a harmful touching, as distinguished from an offensive touch-
ing, the act of the defendant may be a voluntary, negligent
act.
ASSAULT
Definition. An act done by one person which causes, and
is intended to cause, to another an apprehension of an im-
mediate and harmful or offensive touching or contact with
his person is an assault. In Lewis v. Hoover "' the court says:
"An assault is an attempt or offer with violence to do a cor-
poral hurt to another, as if one lift up his cane or fist at an-
other in a threatening manner, or strike at him with a stick,
his fist, or any other weapon, within striking distance, but
miss him." These definitions embody the following essen-
tials: (1) An intent to inflict a battery upon another person
or to cause to him an apprehension of a battery; (2) An act
done for this purpose, as distinguished from mere violent or
abusive language; and (3) An apprehension of a battery.
48 See: State v. Monroe, 121 N. C. 677, 28 S. E. 547, 43 L. R. A. 861, 61
A. S. R. 686 (1897), H. 34.
49 As in Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 52, 50 N. W. 403, 14 L. R. A. 226, 27
A. S. R. 47 (1891), B. 7, W. 46, G. 107.
50 In re Murphy, 109 I1. 31 (1884) ; Miles v. Glad, 299 Il,. App. 185, 19 N. E.
(2d) 844 (1939).
51 3 Blackf. 407 (1834), H. 24.
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Under common law pleading the appropriate and exclusive
form of action for a battery or for an act done with the in-
tention of causing to another person an apprehension of a
battery was trespass for an assault and battery.52 Original-
ly, one function of the writ of trespass was preservation of
the King's peace; acts which created a desire for reprisals
or led to violent self-protection were punished in an action
of trespass. Relief was not given in an action of trespass for
an assault and battery because the interest in freedom from
emotional disturbance was deemed worthy of protection, but
rather because the plaintiff was seeking compensation for
the grievance caused to him by a breach of the King's
peace.5" Thus, we see a probable explanation for the fol-
lowing: (1) Some courts, in recent cases have referred to a
battery as an "assault;" 5 4 (2) The averment that a trespass
was committed vi et armis; (3) Some essentials of a civil
assault, in modern law, are identical with those of criminal
assault, even though forms of action are no longer of con-
trolling importance and the punitive function of the writ of
trespass has been abolished; and (4) Some courts, in recent
cases dealing with assaults, speak of violence offered as caus-
ing the plaintiff to strike in self defense or retreat to avoid
blows. The true test of whether or not the defendant's con-
duct amounts to an assault is not necessarily its tendency to
-produce a breach of the peace, for abusive language has this
tendency and it does not, at the common law, constitute an
assault. Holdsworth refers to a statement in an early case
that threatening words which put the plaintiff in fear and
caused him damage constituted an assault.55 But he says
that the case of Tuberville v. Savage 56 held that a present
52 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 1, Tentative Draft.
53 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 27, Tentative Draft.
54 In Mailand v. Mailand, 83 Minn. 453, 86 N. W. 445 (1901), the court
says: "The least or slightest wrongful and unlawful touching of the person of an-
other is an assault."
55 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd ed.) vol. 8, p. 422.
56 1 Mod. 3 (1669), W. 33, H. 24.
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threat of violence is necessary to constitute an assault. This
case was decided before the fine payable to the Crown in an
action of trespass was abolished.57 The explanation for this
may be -that "the law makes an allowance for the angry pas-
sions of man," 58 and that members of society are expected
to have a certain amount of fortitude. In modern law the
action for an assault is exclusively a private remedy, and it
protects the plaintiff's interest in freedom from apprehension
of a battery.
A civil assault is one of the earliest torts. The first case
to hold that an unsuccessful attempt to commit a battery is
an assault is I de S et ux v. W de S.59 Actions for assault and
battery have passed through three stages. In the Anglo-
Saxon period in England they were probably of a civil na-
ture only and belonged to the civil law. At a later period
and before Bracton's time (13th century) they were both
civil and criminal in nature, probably at the same time.6" By
the time of Bracton a purely criminal proceeding was de-
veloped for the punishment of batteries; this was either by
indictment or by appeal of felony. Actions for assault and
battery became subjects of separate civil and criminal juris-
diction. The appeal, in the sense in which it was used at
this time, was not the removal of a cause from a court of
inferior jurisdiction to one of superior jurisdiction for the
purpose of obtaining a review and retrial; it meant an orig-
inal action, either a criminal prosecution, or it could be used
as a civil remedy by omitting the word "feloniously" from
the charge. The action of trespass supplanted it as a civil
remedy. While Bracton refers to a civil remedy for a bat-
tery,6' it was not until the reign of Edward III, in the four-
teenth century, that assaults began to be considered as dis-
57 By the Statute of 5 & 6 William & Mary, c. 12 (1694).
58 State v. Myerfield, 61 N. C. 108, 110 (1867).
59 Y. B. Lib. Assessorum, Fol. 99, P1. 60 (1348), B. 12, W. 33.
60 See: Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 39.
61 Bracton, 154 b, Sec. 3.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tinct causes of action. Since batteries were redressed and
punished it was but natural that attempts to commit them
should be redressed and punished.6 -
The defendant's conduct may, and frequently does, in-
clude both an assault and a battery. But even where the
defendant's attempt to commit a battery is successful there
is not necessarily an assault. A battery may be inflicted
upon the plaintiff before he has time to be placed in appre-
hension thereof. Also, in case of a battery inflicted upon the
plaintiff by negligent conduct of the defendant there is no
assault.
Physical Act. Mere violent and abusive language does not
constitute an assault.63 Threats over the telephone, even at
short range, do not constitute an assault. 4 In the latter
instance the defendant threatened the plaintiff over the tele-
phone, intimating that he would come over to her home to
avenge himself for an assumed wrong. While this would not
be an assault, the defendant should have been subject to
liability for the intentional infliction of mental suffering.65
"Bare words... are often the exhibition of harmless passion
and do not of themselves constitute a breach of the peace,
as the law supposes that against mere rudeness of language
ordinary firmness will be a sufficient protection." 66  Mere
preparation to commit a battery is not an assault.67
Some physical act, on the part of the defendant, which
seems reasonably calculated to result in a battery, is neces-
62 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 27, Tentative Draft.
63 Irlbeck v. Bierl, 101 Iowa 242, 67 N. W. 400 (1896).
64 Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N. W. 1091, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.)
928 (1913), W. 41.
65 See: Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25
(1932).
66 Per Walker, J., in State v. Daniel, 136 N. C. 571, 48 S. E. 544, 103 A. S. R.
970 (1904).
67 State v. Painter, 67 Mo. 84 (1877). (The court said: "If the defendant had
gone and procured the gun for the express purpose of taking the life of Andrews
(the prosecuting witness), but, after coming up with Andrews, made no demonstra-
tion towards the accomplishment of that purpose, he would not have been guilty.")
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sary to constitute an assault." There must be an "offer to
do violence," or "violence begun to be executed."69 In
Tuberville v. Savage " the court held that a present threat
of violence is necessary to constitute an assault. In most
cases the defendant's conduct involved abusive language, or
threats, accompanied or followed by a physical act or the
use of means reasonably calculated to inflict a battery. Thus,
in Stephens v. Myers "' the defendant, in the course of an
angry discussion, advanced with his fist clenched towards
the plaintiff, with an apparent intent to strike him, and was
stopped by a third person. The jury was instructed that this
constituted an assault. Threatening gestures are sufficient
to constitute an assault. Thus, in Mortin v. Shoppee 72 the
plaintiff was walking along a footpath and the defendant,
who was on horseback, rode after him so as to compel him
to run into his own garden for shelter to avoid being beaten;
this was held to be an assault on the plaintiff.
Intent; Ability to Commit a Battery. In addition to a
physical act, the defendant must intend to put the plaintiff
in apprehension of an immediate and offensive or harmful
touching and have the present ability, actual or apparent,
to inflict such a touching to be subject to liability for an as-
sault. The intent of the defendant and his ability to com-
mit a battery are generally considered together in the cases,
and questions concerning these two essentials usually have
been considered in cases involving the use of firearms. By
the better view, both in civil and criminal assaults, it is not
the secret intent of the defendant, nor the undisclosed fact
of his ability or inability to commit a battery, that is ma-
terial; but what his conduct and the attending circumstances
denote at the time to the plaintiff. It is the probable and
68 Hixson v. Slocum, 156 Ky. 487, 161 S. W. 522, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 838
(1913), W. 39.
69 State v. Daniel, 136 N. C. 571, 48 S. E. 544, 103 A. S. R. 970 (1904).
70 1 Mod. 3 (1669), W. 33, H. 24.
71 4 Car. & P. 349 (1830), W. 34.
72 3 Car. & P. 373 (1828), W. 35.
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natural effect of the conduct of the defendant on the plain-
tiff, or the tendency of the defendant's act to induce a breach
of the peace, that is important in determining whether or
not an assault has been committed. Accordingly, an ap-
parent intent and an apparent present ability to commit a
battery are, by the better view, sufficient in the law of as-
sault.73 Thus, where the defendant points a gun at the plain-
tiff, in a threatening manner, this would constitute an as-
sault, even though the plaintiff may not know whether or
not the gun is loaded and even though the gun is not loaded
and the defendant knows this." All that is necessary is an
intentional act on the part of the defendant, reasonably cal-
culated to create apprehension of a present battery, and a
fear that he might go further and commit a battery upon
the plaintiff's person. On the other hand, in Blake v.
Barnard " there is a dictum that if the defendant points a
gun at the plaintiff, in a threatening manner, and the gun is
not loaded, there is no civil assault. In some states present
ability to inflict the threatened battery is necessary in crimi-
nal cases,7 6 while apparent present ability is sufficient in
civil cases.77
A reckless act which is likely to produce the personal in-
jury which it actually causes has been held to constitute an
assault. Thus, where the defendant whipped up his horses to
great speed and yelled loudly and passed the plaintiff and
team and vehicle in such manner as to be likely to produce
injury, and the act caused the plaintiff's team to run away.
An instruction that this constituted an assault was held to
73 Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872), W. 39; State v. Shepard
10 Iowa 126 (1859); Beach v. Handcock, 27 N. H. 223, 59 A. D. 373 (1853), B.
17, H. 28, Burdick, 566, G. 8; Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 Pac. 700
(1926).
74 See: Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872), W. 39; Beach v.
Handcock, 27 N. H. 223, 59 A. D. 373 (1853), B. 17, H. 28, Burdick 566, G. 8.
75 9 Car. & P. 626 (1840), W. 38.
76 Klein v. State, 9 Ind. App. 365, 36 N. E. 763 (1893).
77 Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N. E. 9, 58 L. R. A. 397 (1902).
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be correct.7" A person who is placed in peril by the negli-
gence of another, but who escapes without physical injury,
is not entitled to recover damages because of the apprehen-
sion of a physical injury." There is no such thing as a negli-
gent assault.8"
By the better view and the weight of authority, an intent
to frighten the plaintiff but not to inflict a physical injury
is a sufficient intent in both criminal and civil assaults.81
While words, or threats, are not sufficient to constitute an
assault, former threats of personal violence, or words pre-
ceding or accompanying the act of the defendant, are im-
portant in giving character to his act, 2 or in determining
vhether or not an apparent intent to commit a battery is
present.8" Thus, in Tuberville v. Savage 4 the defendant
put his hand on his sword and said to the plaintiff: "If it
were not assize time I would not take such language from
you." This was held not to constitute an assault. The
words showed that the defendant did not intend to inflict a
battery, as the court was in session.
In many jurisdictions, either by statutory definition of as-
sault or by judicial decision, the defendant must have had
an actual present ability to inflict a battery at the time of
the alleged assault in order to convict him on a criminal
charge of assault; it makes no difference as -to whether or
78 Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129 Minn. 271, 152 N. W. 645, L. R. A. i915 E,
812 (1915).
79 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kan. 109, 26 Pac. 453 (1891),
B. 20.
80 White v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296, 47 N. E. 90 (1897).
S1 State v. Baker, 20 R. I. 275, 38 Atl. 653, 78 A. S. R. 863 (1897); State v.
Triplett, 52 Kan. 678, 35 Pac. 815 (1894); Pastrana v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 224,
87 S. W. 347 (1905); Burgess v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 697, 118 S. E. 273
(1923). Contra: Dagenhart v. Heller, 93 Wis. 662, 68 N. W. 411, 57 A. S. R.
945 (1896), criticised in 10 Harv. L. Rev. 252.
82 Hulse v. Tollman, 49 Ill. App. 490 (1893); Keep v. Quallman, 68 Wis.
451, 32 N. W. 233 (1887).
83 Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. 3 (1669), W. 33, H. 24; Tubervell v. Savadge,
2 Keble 545 (1669), W. 34; State v. Davis, 1 Ired. L. 125, 35 A. D. 735 (1840),
B. 12.
84 1 Mod. 3 (1669), W. 33, H. 24.
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not the defendant believes he has the present ability to in-
flict a battery. 5 In Alabama it has been held that if the de-
fendant knows he does not have the present ability to inflict
a battery he is not guilty of a criminal assault.86 According
to the better view and the weight of authority, an actual
present ability is not necessary; an apparent present ability
will sustain a criminal charge of assault.8 7 Accordingly,
pointing an unloaded gun at another person who does not
know but that the gun is loaded, in a manner to terrify the
person aimed at and within shooting distance, is a criminal
assault.
Apprehension of a Battery. As a general rule, in order for
the defendant's threat or display of force to constitute an
assault it must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension
of an immediate battery on the part of the plaintiff, that
is, the defendant's conduct must be such as would induce a
person of ordinary firmness to believe he would immediately
receive a harmful or offensive touching.88 If the plaintiff
is peculiarly susceptible to fear and if the defendant knows
this and takes advantage of it to intentionally cause him ap-
prehension of a battery, by a threat of display of force that
would not affect a person of ordinary firmness, the defend-
ant is subject to liability for an assault.89 The movement of
the defendant, however threatening, which does not cause to
the plaintiff a reasonable fear of an immediate battery is not
85 People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800, 29 A. S. R. 165 (1892) ; State
v. Swails, 8 Ind. 524, 65 A. D. 772 (1856); Klein v. State, 9 Ind. App. 365, 36
N. E. 763, 53 A. S. R. 354 (1894).
86 Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43, 6 A. R. 691 (1871).
87 State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598, 124 Pac. 775, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181
(1912); Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872), W. 39; State v. Shepard,
10 Iowa 126 (1859).
88 State v. Davis, 1 Ired. L. 125, 35 A. D. 735 (1840), B. 12; Ross v.
Michael, 246 Mass. 126, 140 N. E. 292 (1923); Dahlin v. Fraser, 206 Minn. 476,
288 N. W. 851 (1939); Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350, 5
A. L. R. 1283 (1918).
89 See: Brooker v. Silverthorne, ill S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350, 5 A. L. R.
1283 (1918).
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an assault."0 In some cases dealing with criminal assaults the
courts have said that an attempt of the defendant to inflict a
battery upon another person may be an assault, even though
the other person is ignorant of the attempt until after it has
been frustrated or abandoned.9' But in State v. Barry 2 the
court held that there can be no assault upon a person who is
unconscious of the attempted battery until after the attempt
has been frustrated or abandoned. This view is in accord
with the modern conception of tort liability for an assault,
according to which emphasis is placed upon the interest pro-
tected (namely, freedom from apprehension of a battery)."
There is a limitation upon the general rule that the de-
fendant's act or threat must cause the plaintiff reasonable
apprehension of an immediate battery, viz., the defendant's
threat is an assault though he gives the plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to escape the threatened battery by complying with
some demand which he (the defendant) has no right to
make.94 In many cases dealing with this limitation there is
an apprehension of a battery because the defendant's con-
duct is such as to cause the plaintiff to doubt the defendant's
intent to refrain from inflicting a battery until the demand
is complied with or because such immediate compliance is
required by the defendant. In United States v. Richard-
son 94a and State v. Church95 the courts referred to the de-
mands as ones which the defendant had no right to make.
But even a lawful demand may be made in a manner that
90 Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. 3 (1669), W. 33, H. 24; Brooker v. Silver-
thorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350, 5 A. L. R. 1283 (1918); Ryan v. Conover, 59
Ohio App. 361, 18 N. E. (2d) 277 (1938) (officer threatened to shoot motorist's tires
unless he stopped).
91 Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, 56 A. R. 42 (1885); People v. Pape, 66
Cal. 366, 5 Pac. 621 (1885); People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. W. 982 (1880).
92 45 Mont. 598, 124 Pac. 775, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181 (1912).
93 See: Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 27, Tentative Draft.
94 United States v. Myers, 1 Cranch 310, Fed. Cas. No. 15,845 (1806), H.
27; United States v. Richardson, 5 Cranch 348, Fed. Cas. No. 16,155 (1837), Brir-
dick 568; Keefe v. State, 19 Ark. 190 (1857), B. 15; Trogden v. Terry, 172 N. C.
540, 90 S. E. 583 (1916), G. 10.
941' 5 Cranch 348, Fed. Cas. No; 16,155 (1837), Burdick 568.
95 63 N. C. 15 (1868).
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will cause a reasonable apprehension of an immediate bat-
tery.96 In State v. Myerfield " the court made a curious
distinction, saying that if the condition is one which the de-
fendant has a right to impose, an "offer to strike" unless the
condition is complied with is not an assault, if the "offer to
strike" is not made with a deadly weapon, but held that be-
cause the defendant had used a deadly weapon to compel
compliance with his demand he was guilty of an assault.
As has been stated in a prior part of this work, mere words,
however insulting or abusive, will not constitute an assault.
The defendant must do some act in execution of his purpose;
and the act and the means used must reasonably appear to
the plaintiff to be adapted to the end, or the plaintiff does
not suffer a reasonable apprehension of a battery. Thus,
where the defendant made threatening gestures towards the
prosecuting witness with an ax but was not within striking
distance of her and not sufficiently near to put her in fear
of being struck, he was held not guilty of an assault.98 On
the other hand, while the defendant may not be within
"striking distance" of the plaintiff at the time the threatened
violence is frustrated or the defendant abandons his purpose,
if the distance is such as to induce a person of ordinary firm-
ness to believe he would instantly receive a blow, unless he
retreated or struck in self defense or unless the defendant's
efforts were otherwise frustrated or he abandoned his pur-
pose, the plaintiff is placed in reasonable apprehension of a
battery.99
96 Ross v. Michael, 246 Mass. 126, 140 N. E. 292 (1923), H. 25.
97 61 N. C. 108 (1867).
9d Grimes v. State, 99 Miss. 232, 54 So. 839, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 982 (1911).
99 State v. Davis, 1 Ired. L. 125, 35 A. D. 735 (1840), B. 12; Tombs v.
Painter, 11 East 1, 104 Eng. Rep. 265 (1810), H. 23 (the plaintiff and the defendant
"being in the same public-house in different parts of the room, the defendant
jumped up from his seat, with his fist clenched, as if to strike the plaintiff, but
was pulled back to his seat by another person, and did not get within reach of
the plaintiff"); Mortin v. Shoppe, 3 Car. & P. 373 (1828), W. 35 (the defendant,
who was on horseback, rode after the plaintiff so as to compel him to run into a
garden for shelter to avoid being beaten).
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It is not necessary that the plaintiff believe that the act
done by the defendant will actually result in a battery. It is
sufficient if he reasonably believes that the defendant will
immediately inflict a battery upon him unless he retreats or
strikes in self defense or unless the defendant's efforts are
otherwise frustrated or he abandons his purpose.' Thus,
if the defendant attempts to strike the plaintiff and the latter
knows he can escape the blow by dodging, outrunning the
defendant, or that bystanders will intervene in time to pre-
vent the threatened blow from taking effect, and a battery
is avoided in one of these ways, there is an assault.
W. D. Rollison.
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100 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 24.
